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ABSTRACT
Media sharing is an extremely popular paradigm of social in-
teraction in online social networks (OSNs) nowadays. The
scalable media access control is essential to perform informa-
tion sharing among users with various access privileges. In
this paper, we present a multi-dimensional scalable media ac-
cess control (MD-SMAC) system based on the proposed scal-
able ciphertext policy attribute-based encryption (SCP-ABE)
algorithm. In the proposed MD-SMAC system, fine-grained
access control can be performed on the media contents en-
coded in a multi-dimensional scalable manner based on data
consumers’ diverse attributes. Through security analysis, we
show that the proposed MC-SMAC system is able to resist
collusion attacks. Additionally, we conduct experiments to
evaluate the efficiency performance of the proposed system,
especially on mobile devices.
Index Terms— SCP-ABE, social media sharing, multi-
dimensional scalable access control
1. INTRODUCTION
Social media sharing has been an extremely popular social
interaction in online social networks (OSN) nowadays. For
example, on the world’s most popular video sharing web site
YouTube, there are more than 1 billion active users, who aver-
agely upload 300 hours of video contents per minute [1]. For
another example, since Facebook has launched the video shar-
ing platform in 2014, more than 1 billion videos are watched
on Facebook every day [2].
Although most of the current social media contents are
free and available for all the others, the portion of social media
contents that require specific access privileges keeps increas-
ing. The phenomena can be driven by interest or by privacy
requirement. In both cases, there is a need of media access
control mechanism. Specifically, since the social media con-
tents are generally stored in the servers owned by the OSNs,
while not managed by the media data distributors themselves,
it is more appropriate to apply encryption-based access con-
trol instead of rule-based access control.
Additionally, due to the diversity of social attributes and
the heterogeneity of network environment associated with dif-
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Fig. 1. 2-by-3-by-2 scalable media data structure
ferent social network users, it is reasonably desired to dis-
tribute a media content in different versions with different
qualities [3]. With the support of scalable media formats
such as JPEG 2000 and H.264 scalable video coding (SVC),
the media stream can be encoded into a base layer that pro-
vides the lowest quality, and enhancement layers for enhanc-
ing the media data quality in terms of multiple factors such
as frame rate, resolution, and SNR [4]. Take the 2-by-3-by-2
data structure shown in Fig.1 as an example, the base layer
(0,0,0) provides the media quality with the lowest SNR, the
lowest frame rate, and the lowest resolution. With an addi-
tional enhancement layer (1,0,0) ((0,1,0), (0,0,1)), the media
quality improves in terms of SNR, (frame rate, resolution).
More enhancement layers corresponds to higher media quali-
ties. We hence need to assign an access key to each layer, and
set an access policy for each media quality. Therefore, under
the scalable media data structure, the access privileges are no
longer just presence and absence, but instead scalable in mul-
tiple dimensions and with the total number of 2 × 3 × 2 in
this example. The multi-dimensional scalable media access
control (MD-SMAC), which is able to enforce the multiple-
dimensional scalable access policies, is therefore expected. In
this paper, we propose a MD-SMAC system based on the pro-
posed scalable ciphtertext policy attribute-based encryption
(SCP-ABE) algorithm, which encrypts multiple messages un-
der a scalable attribute-based access tree. Specifically, we as-
sign an access key for each layer of the scalably encoded me-
dia content, and then encrypt the key under SCP-ABE. The
access on a media layer thus requires decrypting the corre-
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sponding access key under SCP-ABE. A successful decryp-
tion requires the attributes described in the corresponding part
of the SCP-ABE access tree. The more parts an individual’s
attributes can satisfy the access tree, the more media layers
the individual can decrypt, and hence the higher media qual-
ity the individual can enjoy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section
2 we introduce the related work. In Section 3 we present the
proposed MD-SMAC system for social media sharing. Se-
curity and performance analysis are presented in Section 4.
Finally, conclusions are summarized in Section 5.
2. RELATED WORK
As we know, when a media content is encoded in a scal-
able manner, there will be multiple layers generated. As a
consequence, key distribution will become troublesome since
multiple access keys may be sent to one data consumer. In
order to reduce the cost of key distribution, related works
[3, 5, 6, 7] usually expand one access key as multiple seg-
ments. The number of segments is equal to the number of di-
mensions. Additionally, segments of lower-level access keys
can be generated from the corresponding segments of higher-
level access keys through one-way hash chains. In this way,
only one access key needs to be sent to each data consumer.
Hence, the key distribution cost suppose to significantly de-
crease with slightly sacrificing the computation cost.
Unfortunately, such method may result in user collusion
when the media layers are organized following the multi-
dimensional scalable format. That is two users may collude
with each other to generate a valid but illegal access key for
unauthorized higher level access. The resistance of such col-
lusion attack requires increasing the number of key segments.
From the results shown in [3], the best performance of a col-
lusion secure scheme needs mn key segments under a m-by-
n-by-k (k = max(m,n, k)) data structure, but at the same
time results in O(mnk) more hash calculations. As a result,
the communication cost saved by segmenting access keys is
less significant, while the resulted computation cost is more
than expected. Therefore, the aim to reduce the cost of key
distribution is not sufficiently meaningful.
We hence consider a more important issue of scalable ac-
cess control under the social media sharing application as
how to distribute the access keys among media data con-
sumers. To solve this problem, a recent research [8] has re-
ported a multi-message ciphertext policy attribute-based en-
cryption (MCP-ABE) scheme to achieve fine-grained scal-
able media access control. Specifically, this scheme sets a
scalable access policy for the scalable media data, and en-
crypts the access keys under the policy. Data consumers
with proper attributes can obtain the specific access keys and
then acquire the media data with the corresponding quality.
This scheme is rather flexible in terms of key distribution,
since the data distributor does not need to distribute access
keys for each consumer. However, this scheme only consid-
ers the media data with one-dimensional scalability. In [9],
a 2-dimensional scalable access control scheme is proposed
by converting the 2-dimensional scalable data structure into a
tree structure. But there is no discuss on how to expand the
scheme to achieve MD-SMAC. This issue is addressed in our
work. More specifically, we propose a MD-SMAC system
based on the proposed SCP-ABE algorithm, which is able to
adapt to data structures that are scalable in terms of arbitrary
dimensions.
3. THE PROPOSED MD-SMAC SYSTEM
3.1. System Overview
In the proposed scalable media access control architecture as
shown in Fig.2, there are four communication parties, i.e. the
data distributor who owns the copyright of the media contents,
the data consumers who are interested in the media contents,
the OSN servers run by the social networking site, and the at-
tribute authority (AA) who authorizes the attributes involved
in the access policies. In practice, the AA can be run by a
trusted third party. Or alternatively, data distributors can run
their AAs by themselves. In either way, the AA should be
guaranteed accessible by the data consumers.
In the system, a media stream is encoded into a manner
that the quality is scalable in multiple dimensions. Each re-
sulted media layer is encrypted by an access key1, which is
further encrypted under the SCP-ABE algorithm. The en-
crypted media stream and the encrypted access keys are stored
on the OSN servers, and accessible for all data consumers. A
data consumer decrypts the media stream by first decrypting
the access keys using their SCP-ABE user keys that are as-
signed by the AA according to their attributes.
3.2. Access Privileges in The System
The principle of scalable media access control is that the ac-
cess to the higher level media layer guarantees the access to
the lower level media layer [3]. In attribute-based access con-
trol schemes, attributes determine access privileges. There-
fore, to achieve scalable access control, the attributes associ-
ated with the higher level layer should also satisfy the access
policy to the lower level layer. In a 3D-scalable media data
structure, e.g. the 2-by-3-by-2 one shown in Fig.1, suppose
the access policy associated with the layer ijk(i = 0, 1; j =
0, 1, 2; k = 0, 1) is Pijk, then we always have:
Pijk ⊆ Ppql, i ≤ p, j ≤ q, k ≤ l
Based on this rule, we can further conclude that:
Pijk ⊆ Ppql∩Pmng, i ≤ min(p,m), j ≤ min(q, n), k ≤ min(l, g)
We follow these access privilege enforcement principles when
designing the SCP-ABE algorithm. For the 2D-scalable me-
dia data structure shown in Fig.3, we hence have P11(I1) ⊆
1The encryption algorithm is out of the scope of our discussion.
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Fig. 2. Multi-Dimensional Scalable Social Media Sharing And Access Control
P12 ∩ P21(I2), P12 ⊆ P13, and P21 ⊆ P22. Furthermore, we
have I2 ⊆ P13 ∩ P22(I3). Similarly, we have I3 ⊆ I4.
3.3. The SCP-ABE algorithm
The proposed SCP-ABE algorithm is a variation of the CP-
ABE algorithm [10]. In CP-ABE scheme, a message is en-
crypted under an access policy and a secret key of a user is
associated with a set of attributes, which are authorized by at-
tribute authorities (AAs). A user could decrypt the message
only if his or her attributes satisfy the access policy. Instead
of encrypting one message in one ciphertext as in CP-ABE,
SCP-ABE encrypts multiple ones in one ciphertext. Under
the proposed MD-SMAC system, a message refers to an ac-
cess key that is used to encrypt a media layer. The messages a
user can decrypt depends on the individual’s access privilege,
which is determined by the individual’s attributes.
Similar to CP-ABE, SCP-ABE algorithm is also based on
the bilinearity property and the non-degeneracy property of
bilinear map. Moreover, SCP-ABE algorithm is composed of
six sub-algorithms including system setup, access tree con-
struction, encryption, decryption, user key generation, and
delegation. We present SCP-ABE by first introducing the
properties of bilinear map, and then describing each sub-
algorithm.
3.3.1. Bilinear Map
Let G0 and G1 be two multiplicative cyclic groups of prime
order p. Let g be a generator of G0 and e be a bilinear map,
e : G0 ×G0 → G1. Then e has the following properties:
• Bilinearity: for all u, v ∈ G0 and a, b ∈ Zp, we have
e(ua, vb) = e(u, v)ab.
• Non-degeneracy: e(g, g) 6= 1.
3.3.2. System Setup
The setup algorithm chooses a bilinear group G0 of prime
order p with generator g, and two random exponents α, β ∈
Zp. The public key PK and the master key MK are returned
as: {PK = G0, g, h = gβ , f = g1/β , e(g, g)α}, {MK =
β, gα}.
3.3.3. Access Tree Construction
Given the scalable data structure and the corresponding ac-
cess policies, the access key generation algorithm constructs
the access tree, which has the feature that the access to higher
level data layer guarantees the access to lower level data layer,
but not vice versa. For ease of presentation, we here use the
2D-scalable (M -by-N ) data structure to describe the access
tree construction algorithm. However, note that the process is
applicable for multiple-dimensional scalable data structure.
Suppose that the access policy corresponding to each data
segment mij (i = 1, 2, ...,M ; j = 1, 2, ..., N) is Pij . The
access policy has the property that Pij < Pmn if i+j < p+q,
meaning that all rules in Pij are included in Ppq if mpq has
longer distance to m11 than mij . Then the access tree T is
constructed as following.
a. To begin with, we define the referee for mij(i =
1, 2, ...,M ; j = 1, 2, ..., N) as the key(s) in the path
from mij to m11 that is (are) nearest to mij . The ref-
eree for m11 is defined as itself. In the example shown
in Fig. 5, the referees of m12,m21,m13,m22, and m23
are (m11), (m11), (m12), (m12,m21), and (m13,m22),
respectively. Additionally, we divide the data segments
into M + N − 1 groups according to their distances to
m11 in the data structure. Under the data structure shown
in Fig. 5, there are four groups, i.e. G1 = (m11),
G2 = (m12,m21), G3 = (m13,m22), and G4 = (m23).
Let Ui(i = 1, ...,M+N−1) be the union access policy of
members in groupGi, and Ii be the common access policy
of members in group Gi.
b. Construct the sub-tree T iq(i = 1, 2, ...,M+N−3) accord-
ing to Ii+1 \ Ii.
c. Then we construct T11 according to P11, and Tij(i =
2, ...,M |j = 1; j = 2, ..., N |i = 1) according to
Pij \ (Ik ∪ P ′ij), where Ik is the common access policy
of members in group Gk that Pij belongs to, and P ′ij is
the referee(s) of Pij . The root Rij(i = 1, 2, ...,M ; j =
1, 2, ..., N) of Tij is called key node.
d. Let Rij(i = 2, ...,M |j = 1; j = 2, ..., N |i = 1) and
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Fig. 3. An indication of SCP-ABE access tree construction
an additional attribute aij be the children of the and gate,
build the subtree T ′ij , whose root is Vij .
e. Let all Vij in the group Gi(i = 2, 3, ...,M + N − 2) be
the children of the 1/|Gi| gate, build the group subtree Ti.
Let TM+N−1 be T ′MN , and T1 be T11.
f. The whole access tree is constructed group by group in a
bottom-to-up manner. Starting from i = M +N − 2, for
group Gi, let an and gate be the mother of the root of Ti
and an or gate whose children are a selected attribute ai
and the root of Ti+1. Then let the and gate and T i−1q be
the children of a new and gate. Let the new constructed
tree as Ti, and recursively do the previous steps until all
groups are in the access tree. The root of the access tree
will be an and gate.
Then we choose a polynomial px for each tree node x in
the access tree T in a manner as: (1) From the bottom to up,
set the degree dx of the polynomial px to be dx = kx − 1,
where kx is the threshold value of node x; (2) For the root
node root, choose a random s ∈ Zp and set proot(0) = s,
and randomly choose other points of polynomial proot; (3)
For any other node x, set px(0) = pparent(x)(index(x)), and
randomly choose other points of px. Figure 3 indicates a case
of access tree construction based on a 2-by-3 data structure.
In the access tree structure, we have added some addi-
tional attributes except for the attributes related to the access
policies. Specifically, ai(i = 1, 2, ...,M + N − 2) is used
to enable users to compute starting from the level where Gi
locates. For example, if the attributes of a user only conform
to P11, the user takes the user key corresponding to attributes
in P11 and a1 as input of the decryption algorithm, and per-
forms decryption operation starting from the level that G1 lo-
cates. If the user has attributes that conform to P12, he or
she can instead perform decryption starting from the level
that G2 locates. Additionally, aij(i = 2, ...,M |j = 1; j =
2, ..., N |i = 1) is used to guarantee the uniqueness of each
key node, which is essential to enforce the access policies.
For example, without a12 and a21, pR12(0) will be equal to
pR21(0) since their mother node has the degree of zero. As
a result, a user who can access pR12(0) will also be able to
access pR21(0) even without the required attributes.
3.3.4. Encryption
The encryption algorithm encrypts the data segments. Let L
be the set of leaf nodes in T , K be the set of key nodes Vij
(i = 1, 2, ...,M ; j = 1, 2, ..., N), and mij be the correspond-
ing data segment, the ciphertext is given as
CT = (T ,∀i ∈ L : Ei = gpi(0), E′i = H(att(i))pi(0)
∀Rij ∈ K : C˜ij = mije(g, g)α(pRij (0)+s), Cij = hpRij (0)+s)
3.3.5. Decryption
The decryption algorithm takes as input several messages en-
crypted under an access policy, a secret key SK of a user, and
the public key PK. The number of access keys that a user is
able to decrypt depends on how much the attributes can sat-
isfy the access policy. Suppose that the highest level of access
keys a user can obtain is mpq (1 ≤ p ≤ M, 1 ≤ q ≤ N).
Starting from Tpq , the user needs to perform the following
computation for each leaf node x of Tpq and that locates at
the path from Rpq to the root.
Fx =
e(Dx, Ex)
e(D′x, E′x)
=
e(gr ·H(attrix)rx , gpx(0))
e(grx , H(attrix)px(0))
=
e(gr, gpx(0)) · e(H(attrix)rx , gpx(0))
e(grx , H(attrix)px(0))
= e(g, g)rpx(0)
Then the user recursively computes the corresponding values
of non-leaf nodes including the key nodes, in a bottom-up
manner using polynomial interpolation technique [10], until
reaches the root and obtains:
Froot = e(g, g)
rproot(0) = e(g, g)rs
In this process, the user also obtains:
FRij = e(g, g)
rpRij (0)(i = 1, 2, ..., p, j = 1, 2, ..., q)
Furthermore, the user compute Kij = FRij · Froot =
e(g, g)r(pRij (0)+s). Each data segment mij (i =
1, 2, ..., p, j = 1, 2, ..., q) can then be decrypted as following.
C˜ij
e(Cij , D)/Kij
=
mije(g, g)
α(pRij (0)+s)
e(hpRij (0)+s, g(α+r)/β)/e(g, g)r(pRij (0)+s)
=
mije(g, g)
(α+r)(pRij (0)+s)
e(gβ(pRij (0)+s), g(α+r)/β)
=
mije(g, g)
(α+r)(pRij (0)+s)
e(g, g)β(pRij (0)+s)·(α+r)/β
= mij
3.3.6. User Key Generation
The algorithm generates user secret keys used for deriving
the access keys. Specifically, taking a set of attributes S
as input, the key generation algorithm outputs a secret key
that identifies with the set. The algorithm selects a random
ri ∈ Zp for every attribute in S. Note that S always include
ai(i = 1, 2, ...,M +N − 2), and aij(i = 2, ...,M |j = 1; j =
2, ..., N |i = 1). The user secret key is computed as
SK = {D = g(α+r)/β ,
∀i ∈ S : Di = gr ·H(attrii)ri , D′i = gri}
3.3.7. Delegation
Given a user secret key SK with the attribute set S, the del-
egation algorithm creates a new user secret key ˜SK with the
attribute set S˜ ⊆ S. Specifically, the algorithm selects a ran-
dom number r˜ ∈ Zp and also r˜i ∈ Zp∀i ∈ S˜. Then ˜SK is
created as
˜SK = {D˜ = Df r˜,
∀i ∈ S˜ : D˜i = Digr˜ ·H(attrii)r˜i , D˜i′ = D′igr˜i}
3.4. Discussion
Following the access privilege enforcement principle, the at-
tributes associated with a higher level access key always con-
tains those associated with a lower level access key. If we sim-
ply apply an existing ABE algorithm to encrypt each access
key separately, the computation power will be significantly
wasted on repeatedly computing on the overlapped attributes.
Such redundant computations can be avoided in the proposed
SCP-ABE algorithm, since the access tree is organized in a
scalable manner. Therefore, the proposed SCP-ABE algo-
rithm is essential for the efficiency of the MD-SMAC system.
Additionally, the delegation algorithm in SCP-ABE pro-
vides additional flexibilities for social media sharing. For ex-
ample, if a media data distributor individually runs the AA,
which is not reachable for friends’ friends, the distributor’s
friends can run the delegation algorithm and assign user keys
for their friends. The detailed discussion will be presented in
our future work.
4. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
4.1. Security Performance
By encrypting the media layers resulted from scalable me-
dia format under SCP-ABE, the proposed MD-SMAC sys-
tem enables a data distributor to define fine-grained and scal-
able access privileges on the media contents shared on the
OSNs. In this process, there is a potential collusion issue that
two or more data consumers may collude with each other and
try to obtain an access privilege higher than they suppose to
deserve. In this section, we present analysis on how collu-
sion resistance is provided by the proposed MD-SMAC sys-
tem. Specifically, we consider collusion in the following two
cases. For ease of presentation, we use the media data struc-
ture shown in Fig. 3.
4.1.1. Cross Group Collusion
A classical collusion issue in SMAC is that the user who
has access key mij (e.g. m13) and other lower level ac-
cess keys (e.g. m11 and m12) collude with the user who
owns access key mpq (e.g. m21) and other lower level ac-
cess keys (e.g. m11), trying to derive the target access key
mkl (k = max(i, p), l = max(j, q), e.g. m23) and all lower
level access keys that the two users do not have (e.g. m22).
Since the target access key always locate at a different group
(as defined in SCP-ABE access tree construction algorithm),
we refer such collusion as cross group collusion.
Since the access keys are encrypted under SCP-ABE, the
success of such collusion requires the attributes of the two
users satisfy the access policy corresponding to the target ac-
cess key. For example, the derivation of m23 from m13 and
m21 needs P23 ⊆ P12 ∪ P21. Under the access privilege en-
forcement principle, we have P12 ∪ P21 ⊆ P22 ⊆ P23. The
success of collusion then requires P23 = P12 ∪ P21, which
means there is no T ′22 or T
′
23 in the access tree and hence no
K22 or K23. However, to avoid that m22 and m23 are trans-
mitted in plain text, they have to be encrypted under SCP-
ABE. Therefore, such collusion is infeasible.
4.1.2. Random Collusion
The other potential collusion issue is that two users exchange
their attributes to obtain a specific access privilege. For ex-
ample, suppose P11 is b0 and b1. One user owns attributes
b1, while the other user just owns the attribute b0. The two
users then try to collude and decrypt m11. For the first
user, he has the following secret key and is able to compute
Fb1 = e(g, g)
rapb1 (0) for leaf node b1 in T11.
SKa = {Da = g(α+ra)/β ,
D1 = g
ra ·H(b1)r1 , D′1 = gr1}
For the second user, he has the following secret key and is
able to compute Fb0 = e(g, g)
rbpb0 (0) for leaf node b0 in T11.
SKb = {Db = g(α+rb)/β ,
D2 = g
rb ·H(b0)r2 , D′2 = gr2}
Their goal is to obtain FR11 , which is essential to derive
K11 and to decrypt m11. However, FR11 should be either
e(g, g)rapR11 (0) or e(g, g)rbpR11 (0). If the first user wants
to compute FR11 , he needs the second user to send him
e(g, g)rapb0 (0), instead of e(g, g)rbpb0 (0) that the second user
has. Therefore, the first user cannot obtain FR11 . Similarly,
the second user cannot obtain FR11 either.
Therefore, the random collusion is also infeasible in our
proposed system.
4.2. Efficiency Performance
In the proposed MD-SMAC system, a media data distributor
always first encrypts their media content before distribution,
while a media data consumer always needs to perform de-
cryption before enjoying the media content. The encryption
and decryption operations on online media contents actually
have already been widely applied in web sites nowadays with
the emergence of security requirement. Therefore, the extra
cost in the proposed MD-SMAC system merely results from
the operations under SCP-ABE. In this section, we present
analysis and experimental results of the SCP-ABE computa-
tion cost on both data distributor side and data consumer side.
4.2.1. Distributor Side Computation Cost
Distributor side computation cost mainly comes from SCP-
ABE encryption, which involves pairings, exponentiations,
and multiplications computations onG0 andG1. The encryp-
tion computation cost linearly increases with the number of
attributes. We measure the average computation time per at-
tribute on the user side on Google Nexus 4 (1.5GHz quad-core
Snapdragon S4 Pro with Krait CPUs, Android 5.0), and on
Lenovo T430 (2.6GHz Intel i5 CPU, Ubuntu 14.04)2, which
are 60ms and 35ms respectively. Suppose the given media
content hasM layers, and the access policy of layer i involves
ni (ni+1 > ni) attributes. Plus the additional N attributes
involved in the SCP-ABE algorithm, there will be nM + N
attributes in total. The total computation time of SCP-ABE
encryption and decryption can be obtained accordingly.
4.2.2. Consumer Side Computation Cost
Consumer side computation cost results from SCP-ABE de-
cryption, which include pairings and multiplications compu-
tations on G1. For SCP-ABE decryption, the computation
cost is not only impacted by the number of attributes, but also
by the access policies. For simplification, we adjust the access
policies and make the computation cost grow with the number
of attributes in approximately linear way, and test the compu-
tation time per ten attributes on devices. The result is 48ms
on smart phone and 25ms on laptop. The server side compu-
tation cost comes from delegation. The AA side computation
cost comes from user key generation. Both of the two algo-
rithms involve in exponentiations and multiplications on G0
2As in [10], operations are conducted using a 160-bit elliptic curve group
based on the curve y2 = x3 + x over 512-bit finite field.
andG1. According to the results provided in [10], the compu-
tation time of user key generation is about 30ms per attribute
on workstation with 64-bit 3.2 Ghz Pentium 4 processor. The
computation time of delegation is almost the same.
5. CONCLUSION
We have presented in this paper a novel scalable ciphertext
policy attribute-based encryption (SCP-ABE) algorithm, and
based on what designed a multi-dimensional scalable media
access control (MD-SMAC) system. With this system, we
are able to achieve secure and fine-grained access control on
social media contents encoded in multi-dimensional scalable
format. We have confirmed the effectiveness of the proposed
system through both numerical analysis and mobile terminal
implementation with typical laptop and smart phone.
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